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Amortized communication complexity of an
equality predicate.(Beta version)
Vladimir Nikishkin
Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology
Abstract. We study the communication complexity of the direct sum
of independent copies of the equality predicate. We prove that the prob-
abilistic communication complexity of this problem is equal to O(N);
computational complexity of the proposed protocol is polynomial in size
of inputs. Our protocol improves the result achieved in [11]. Our con-
struction is based on two techniques: Nisan’s pseudorandom generator
[4] and Smith’s string synchronization algorithm [9].
1 Introduction
In this paper we study amortized communication complexity of the equality
predicate. We deal with the classic model of communication complexity with
two participants (Alice and Bob), who want to compute some function of the
data distributed between the participants. Alice and Bob can talk to each other
via a communication channel. We measure the number of bits that must be
transmitted between Alice and Bob to achieve the goal.
More specifically, let f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a function of two
arguments. We assume that Alice is given the value of x, Bob is given the value
of y, and Alice and Bob communicate with each other to compute the value
f(x, y). We denote by C(f) deterministic communication complexity of function
f , i.e., the minimal number of bits that should send by Alice and Bob to each
other to get f(x, y).
Further, let us denote by fN the direct sum of N independent copies of the
initial function f . More formally, the two arguments of f are an N -tuples of
values (x1, . . . , xN ) and N -tuple of values (y1, . . . , yN ), and
fN (x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN ) = (f(x1, y1), . . . , f(xN , yN )).
We assume that Alice is given all values of xi, and Bob is given all values of yi.
Now ALice and Bob need to compute fN , i.e., to get all the values f(xi, yi) for
i = 1, . . . , N . Amortized communication complexity of f is defined as
AC(f) = lim sup
N→∞
fN
N
.
It was proven in [11] that AC(f) = Ω(
√
C(f)− logn).
In a similar way, amortized communication complexity can be defined for
probabilistic version of communication complexity. In general, the properties of
amortized randomized communication complexity remains not well understood,
though several nontrivial particular examples are known. For instance, in [11]
it was proven that amortized randomized complexity of the equality predicate is
only O(1), while it is known that for one individual predicate EQ : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}
EQ(x, y) =
{
1, if x = y,
0, if x 6= y
randomized communication complexity is equal to Θ(log n).
In our paper we construct a new randomized communication protocol for
the direct sum of the equality predicate. Our protocol is computationally ef-
fective, i.e., it only requires polynomial computations for Alice and Bob. Our
construction improves the result from [11] in two respects. First of all, we get a
slightly better bound for the probability of error. And, second, our protocol has
a “modular” structure; it consist of several independent gadgets, which make the
construction more flexible. We hope that the same technique can be applied to
other problems of communication complexity.
Our principal result can be formulated as follows:
Main theorem. Probabilistic communication complexity (for the private coin
model) of a direct sum ofN equality predicates is equal toO(N), with probability
of the error Perr ≤ O(2
−c N
log2 N ). Moreover, we explicitly construct a communi-
cation protocol that achieves this communication complexity and requires only
polynomial time computations on Alice’s and Bob’s sides.
In our construction, we use several classic tools (N. Nisan’s pseudorandom
generator, BCH codes, deterministic synchronization protocol by A. Orlitsky)
and one relatively new construction (A.Smith’s probabilistic synchronization
protocol).
1.1 Model
We use three standard models of communication complexity: deterministic com-
munication protocols, randomized communication protocols with public random
bits, and randomized communication protocols with private random bits, see
Nisan’s and Kushlevitz’s textbook [1]. We done communication complexities for
these three models by Cdet, Cpub, and Cpriv respectively.
Our principal construction is in a sense, an explicit and effective implemen-
tation of the following theorem for some particular communication protocol.
Theorem 1 (Comm. Compl. [1]). Let f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a
function of two arguments. For every δ > 0 and every ε > 0, it holds
Cε+δpriv(f) < C
ε
pub(f) +O(log n+ log δ
−1).
1.2 Our main problem
Equality predicate (EQn). First of all, we remind the following classic prob-
lem of communication complexity. Alice and Bob each hold an n-bit string, x
and y respectively. They want to know whether x = y. Formally, they want to
compute the value of the predicate
EQn(x, y) =
{
1, if x = y,
0, if x 6= y.
Direct sum of equality functions (EQNn ). Both Alice and Bob hold some
array of N of n-bits blocks. Formally, inputs of Alice and Bob are bit strings
of length n · N . But it is more instructive to represent the input of Alice as
x = x1 . . . xN and the input of Bob as y = y1 . . . yN , where xi, yi ∈ {0, 1}
n for
each i = 1, . . . , N . Then we define EQNn as EQ
N
n (x, y) = z ∈ {0, 1}
N , where
each i-th bit of z is equal to 1 iff xi = yi. Intuitively this means that Alice and
Bob wants to compute the value of the predicate EQn for N independent pairs
of inputs (xi, yi).
Communication complexity of the function EQNn is the main subject of our
paper. More precisely, we want to estimate the probabilistic communication com-
plexity of this function in the model with private sources of randomness.
2 The known results
2.1 Complexity of EQn for different types of communication
protocols.
The predicate EQn is pretty well studied, and its communication complexity are
well understood. Let us remind three different communication protocols for this
predicate.
2.1.0.1 Deterministic model. It is known that Cdet(EQn) = n+1. The bound is
achieved by a trivial protocol: Alice transmits her string x to Bob, Bob compares
the two strings x and y and sends back one-bit response, 1 if the strings are equal
and 0 otherwise. From the standard technique of fooling sets it follows that this
bound is tight, i.e., there is no protocols with communication complexity less
than n+ 1.
2.1.0.2 Private coin model For the randomized communication complexity with
private sources of randomness Cεpriv(EQn) = O(log
n
ε
). This bound is achieved
by several classic communication protocols. In what follows we describe one of
them. Alice and Bob view their inputs x and y as n-digits binary representations
of integers (between 0 and 2n − 1 ). Alice chooses a prime number p at random
among the first (n/ε) primes. She sends to Bob both p and x mod p. Bob verifies
whether x mod p = y mod p. If x and y are equal to each other modulo p, then
Bob returns outputs 1, otherwise he returns 0.
If x = y, then this protocol always return the correct result. If x 6= y, then
the difference (x − y) has at most n prime factors; hence, the protocol returns
the wrong answer with probability at most ε.
2.1.0.3 Public coin model For the randomized communication complexity with
public sources of randomness
Cεpub(EQn) = O(log
1
ε
).
This bound for the communication complexity is achieved by the following proto-
col. Alice and Bob jointly choose a random n-bit string n. Then Alice computes
the inner product b = 〈x, r〉 and transmits the result (a single bit) to Bob. Bob
checks whether b = 〈y, r〉 and outputs "equal" if so and "not equal" otherwise.
Obviously, if x = y, then the output is always "equal." On the other hand, if
x 6= y, then by the properties of the inner product, Pr[〈x, r〉 6= 〈y, r〉] = 12 . Thus,
Bob outputs "not equal" with probability 12 . To decrease the probability to get
the wrong answer, Alice and Bob should repeat these procedure several times
with several independently chosen random strings r. If Alice and Bob repeat (in
parallel or sequentially) l times the discribed procedure, then the probability
that 〈x, r〉 6= 〈y, r〉 for all r1, . . . , rl is equal to 2
−l. So, for l = ⌈log 1/ε⌉ we
reduce the probability to get an error to ε, while communication complexity is
O(log 1/ε).
2.2 Trivial generalizations for EQN
n
The protocols from the previous section can be easily adapted to get some pro-
tocols for the direct sum of N copies of EQn, i.e., for the function EQ
N
n .
2.2.0.4 Adaptation of the protocol from paragraph 2.1.0.2 We run the protocol
independently for each pair of blocks(xi, yi). The probability to get a wrong
answer for at least one pair of blocks must be bounded by ε. To this end we
need to reduce the probability of an error for each of N pairs of blocks to be less
than ǫ′ = ε/N . This results in communication complexity O(N(log(n/ε′))) =
O(N(log n+logN+log 1/ε))). Thus, from the trivial adaptation of the protocol
from paragraph 2.1.0.2 we get
Cεpriv(EQ
N ) = O(N(log n+ logN + log 1/ε)))
2.2.0.5 Adaptation of the protocol from paragraph 2.1.0.3 We run the protocol
from section 2.1.0.3 for each pair of blocks (xi, yi) independently. To guarantee
than the total probability of the error is bounded by ε, we need to reduce the
probabilities of errors for each pair of blocks to ǫ′ = ǫ/N . Then we get
Cǫpub(EQ
N ) = O(N(logN + log 1/ǫ)))
2.2.0.6 From public to private randomness The last protocol above can be
transformed into a protocol with private sources of randomness. Indeed, from
theorem 1 we get immediately
Cpriv = O(N · logN + log
1
ǫ
+ log(n ·N) + log
1
δ
) =
= O(N · logN + logn+ logN + log
1
ǫ
) = O(N · logN)
Note that this communication protocol requires exponential computational com-
plexity (at least for the standard proof of theorem 1).
Can we reduce the obtained (rather trivial) bound O(N · logN), hopefully to
O(N)? Can we achieve this bound with a communication protocol that requires
only poly-time computations? The answers both these questions are positive.
Construction of such a communication protocol is the main result of this paper.
Loosely speaking, we plan to do it in two steps. At the first step, we construct
more effective communication protocol for communication model with public
randomness (this part of our construction is based on ideas of A. Smith). At
the second step, we reduce this protocol with a public source randomness to
a protocol with private randomness. In some sense, this idea is similar to the
usual proof of theorem 1: we substitute the sequence of random bits (shared by
Alice and Bob) by a sequence of pseudorandom bits, which can be obtained as
an output of a pseudo-random bits generator. A random seed of this generator
is rather short. So, one of participants can choose it at random and then send
to another participants. E.g., Alice choses a random seeds and send it to Bob;
then ALice and Bob apply the pseudo-random bits generator to this same seed,
and then both participants share the same long string of pseudo-random bits.
The sharp difference between our construction and the standard general proof
of theorem 1 is that we use an explicit and effectively computable generator (the
generator of N. Nisan).
Before we explain details of our construction, we remind the technical tools
used in our proof.
3 The tools used in our construction
3.1 Pseudorandom number generator
In our construction we need a pseudo-random generator that fools tests with
a bounded memory. Technically, we assume that a generator is a mapping G :
{0, 1}m → {0, 1}n, and a test is a randomized Turing machine with working
space of some size S.
Definition. A function G : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n is called a pseudorandom
generator is ε-robust for tests with space S, if for every statistical test A with S
bits of working space
|Pry∈r{0,1}n [A accepts y]− Pry∈r{0,1}m [A accepts G(x)]| < ε.
By statistical test we mean the following construction.
Definition A statistical test with space S(n) is a deterministic Turing ma-
chine M with three tapes: a working tape of size space S(n), an auxiliary read-
only tape with some binary strings a = (a1, ...an, ...) (an advice string), and a
one-way input tape with an n-bits input x (the reading head on the input tape
can move from the left to the right but cannot move back to the left). We always
assume that the length of a should not be greater than exp(S(n)). This machine
returns input 1 or input 0. We denote this result Ma(x). Informally the output
means that test accepts/rejects x given an advice string a.
Nisan suggested in [4] an explicit construction of a pseudo-random gener-
ator that fools tests with small enough memory. This result of Nisan can be
formulated as follows.
Theorem 2. There exists a constant c > 0 such that for any R and S there
exists a pseudorandom generator G : cS logR→ R (computable in time poly(R))
that is 2−S-robust for statistical tests with S bits of working space.
In section 4.3.3 we construct some statistical test, which verifies that a
(pseudo)random string x is suitable for our communication protocol. Then, we
use the standard argument: our protocol with high probability returns the cor-
rect answer when it runs with truly random public bits; futher, the generator of
Nisan fools our test; hence, given In section 4.3.3 we construct some statistical
test that tests that a random string is suitable for our communication protocol.
Then, we use the standard argument: the protocol with high probability returns
the correct answer if runs on truly random public bits; futher, the generator of
Nisan fools our test; hence, given pseudo-random bits instead of truly random
ones, the communication protocol must also returns the correct answer with
hight probability.
3.2 BCH codes
We also use in our construction the classic BCH-codes, see [12]. We do not
employ any specific properties of the construction of the BCH codes. We use
only the fact that ∀m > 3, t < 2m−1 exists an explicit construction of a linear
code with parameters [n, k, d] such that codeword length n = 2m−1, the number
of checksum bits is n− k ≤ mt, and the minimal distance between of the code is
d ≥ 2t+ 1. We also use the fact that the BCH codes can be decoded efficiently
(by Berlekamp-Messy algorithm), [13].
The BCH construction is not explicitly used in the article. Still, Orlitzky’s
construction 3.3 we do utilize, needs an error-correcting code, which is not ex-
plicitly given in Orlitzky’s article. The BCH code is fits in his construction and
we are going to use it when refering to Orlitzky’s construction.
3.3 Strings synchronization protocols
In our communication protocol we will need to solve the following auxiliary
problem. Let Alice and Bob each hold an n-bits string, A and B respectively.
We assume that A and B differ from eahc other in at most e positions. Alice
and Bob want to exchange their inputs, i.e., Alice should get string B, and Bob
should get string A. We will call this problem by string synchronization problem
(Alice and bob want to synchronize their inputs).
Orlitsky suggested in [3] a deterministic communication protocol for the prob-
lem of synchronization of a pair n-bits strings at the Hamming distance at most
e. Communication complexity of this protocol is O(e logn). All computations of
Alice and Bob in this protocol run in polynomial time.
More formally, the theorem (formulation taken from [2]) looks the following:
Theorem 3. Given an error-corrcting code with parameters (α.R(α)) which sat-
isfies the following conditions:
1. It is linear.
2. An effective decoding algorithm exists.
A one-round communication protocol with communication complexity C =
(1 − R(α)) · n can be constructed. Computational complexity of such protocol is
polynomial.
If using the BCH code(noted in section 3.2), the communication complexity
of this protocol is: O(e log n)
The protocol of Orlitsky makes sense if the distance e between strings is very
small. In case e = Ω(n), communication complexity of the protocol of Orlitsky
is worse than the trivial bound 2n.
Adam Smith suggested in [9] a randomized communication protocol for the
problem of strings synchronization, with asymptotically optimal bound for com-
munication complexity for the case e = const · n. More precisely, Smith proved
that for every δ = δ(n) = Ω( log log n√
logn
) there exists an explicit family of com-
munication protocols (with private sources of randomness) that solve the prob-
lem for synchronization of n bit strings at that differ in at most e positions,
with communication complexity n(H( e
n
) + δ) and error ε = 2−Ω(
δ
3
n
logn ), where
H(p) = p log2
1
p
+ (1 − p) log 11−p . Algorithms of Alice and Bob in this protocol
run in polynomial time.
4 The main result
4.1 Formulation
By EQn we denote an equality predicate problem, by EQ
N
n we denote a direct
sum of such problems.
Theorem 4. Probabilistic communication complexity (for the private coin model)
of a EQNn is equal to O(N), with an error probability Perr ≤ O(2
−c N
log2 N ) if n <
N. Moreover, there exists a protocol with the required communication complexity
and only polynomial time computations for Alice and Bob.
4.2 Overview of the protocol
Our protocol runs as follows. First of all, Alice generates a string of truly random
bits of length O(N) and send this string to Bob. They both generate pseudo-
random bits from this seed. In what follows, Alice and Bob use this long string
of pseudo-random bits.
Then, Alice and Bob iteratively calculate "checksums" (inner products with
pseudo-random string) for their n-bits blocks and synchronize strings of resulting
checksums using the probablilistic or the deterministic protocol from section 3.3.
As soon as some pair of non-equal blocks X i, Y i is revealed (if some checksums
for these blocks are different), Alice and Bob withdraw these blocks from the list
of their bit strings and never test them again. Thus, on each next iteration the
fraction of non-equal pairs of blocks (that are not discovered yet) becomes less
and less.
On each next iteration, we make the length of checksums longer and longer,
so for each pair of non-equal blocks the probability to be discovered becomes
closer and closer to 1. Hence, the fraction of (non-discovered) pairs of non-equal
blocks gradually reduces, and only pairs of equal blocks remain untouched at
their places. This means that on each next iteration the Hamming distance
between arrays of checksums (obtained by Alice and Bob respectively) becomes
less and less.
On each iteration Alice and Bob need to exchange the checksums computed
for their blocks of bits (inner products with the same pseudo-random bits). For
several first iterations (technically, for log logN iterations) we use the random-
ized synchronization protocol by Smith. Then we switch to the deterministic
protocol by Orlitsky.
In what follows we explain this protocol in more detail.
4.2.1 Generation stage Alice generates
r = log (n ·N)4 · log(2
N
log (n·N) ) = O(N)
random bits and sends them to Bob. Then Alice and Bob apply Nisan’s pseudo-
random generator from section 3.1 and get R = n2N2 pseudo-random bits. The
length of the seed r is chosen so that the generator is ε-robust against tests with
working space of size Nlog (n·N) .
4.2.2 Probabilistic synchronization stage, steps i = 1, . . . , log logN)
Synchronization protocols we use expect to know the distance between strings
in advance. As we may not know an initial distance between X and Y, we will
add N dummy, equal blocks to X and Y. This will guarantee the share of non
equal pairs to be less then 0.5. This is a coarse trick, but it will not affect the
asymptotic complexity of our protocol.
We repeat log logN times the following procedure. We let λi =
2i
logN . Alice
and Bob calculate checksums of length λi for each of their blocks (that are
not yet proven to be different). The checksum for each block consists of inner
products modulo 2 between this block and a new portion of pseudorandom bits
generated on the previous stage. Thus, the resulting checksums (for Alice and
Bob) consists of λiN bits.
Then Alice and Bob exchange their checksums using the randomized protocol
of strings synchronization; when we apply this protocol, we assume that Alice’s
and Bob’s checksums differ from each other in a fraction at most 2−i.
When the checksums are exchanged, Alice and Bob remove from their lists
the blocks X i, Y i whose checksums are not identical.
Note that for a pair of equal blocks X i, Y i, the checksums are always equal.
If blocks are not equal to each other, the chance to get all equal checksums is
about 2−λi (this probability is not exactly 2−λi since Alice and Bob use not
random but pseudo-random bits to compute the inner products).
Typically, on each step the number of non-discovered pairs of non-equal
blocks X i, Y i becomes more than twice less. We say that the i-th step of the
described procedure fails, if at this stage Alice and Bob discover less than 50%
of the pairs of non-equal blocks X i, Y i (less than a half of all pairs of non-equal
blocks that was not discovered earlier). If at least one step fails, we cannot guar-
antee correctness of the result of the protocol. If no steps fail, then on each i-th
step the arrays of checksums of Alice and Bob differ from each other in a fraction
at most 1/2i of all computed inner products.
Communication complexity of this stage is the sum of communication com-
plexities of copies of Smith’s protocol run for each step i = 1, . . . , log logN :
log logN∑
i=1
H(1/2i)λiN = O(N).
The last equation follows from the choice of λi and the asymptotic H(α) =
α log(1− α) +O(1) as α tends to 0.
4.2.3 Deterministic synchronization stage, steps i = log logN+1, . . . , logN
At this stage we continue essentially the same procedure as at the prevoius stage.
On each step Alice and Bob get λi =
2i
log2 N
bits of random checksums for each
pair of blocks (that are not proven yet to be not-equal) by computing the inner
products with new portions of pseudo-random bits; then Alice and Bob exchange
the computed checksums. The difference is only how the participants exchange
their checksums. Now they use the deterministic protocol by Orlitsky instead of
the instead of probabilistic protocol by Smith, see section 3.3.
Communication complexity of the deterministic protocol is about logN times
grater than complexity of the protocol by Smith. But nevertheless we can use it
since the value of λi is reasonably small. The communication complexity of this
stage is
logN∑
i=log logN
[
Nλi logN
2i
] =
logN∑
i=log logN
logN · 2i
log2N · 2i
·N = O(N).
4.2.4 Summary When the described stages are completed, we believe that
Alice and Bob has found all pairs of non-equal blocks. In all remaining pairs X i,
Y i (in all pairs of blocks whose checksums at all steps of the protocol were equal
to each other) are considered equal.
4.3 Probability of an error
We need to estimate the probability of an error in our protocol. For simplicity, let
us assume at first, that instead of R pseudo-random bits Alice and Bob share R
independent and uniformly distributed random bits (so, we temporarily switch
to the model with a public source of randomness). Then stages 4.2.3 and 4.2.3
make sense, and we can estimate the probability of an error in the protocol.
The protocol may return a wrong answer because of the following reasons:
1. The probabilistic synchronization protocol of Smith’s fails at some stage.
2. Some of steps i = 1, . . . , logN fails since to many random checksums are
equal for non-equal pairs of blocks X i, Y i.
Let us bound probabilities of each of these bad events.
4.3.1 Error in the probabilistic synchronization. We sum up the prob-
abilities of errors in Smith’s synchronization at each step of our protocol:
P (Err) =
log logN∑
i=1
O(2−(
N
logN )) ≤ O(2−
cN
logN )
for some constant c > 0.
4.3.2 The failure of because of checksums Some step i = 1, . . . , logN
fails if for more than a half of (not discovered yet) pairs of non-equal blocks X i,
Y i all random checksums turn out to be equal. We estimate the probability of
this event with Chernoff’s inequality. We may assume that after the first (i− 1)
steps there remain N/2i pairs of pairs of non-equal blocks.
We use our checksum scheme like some kind of a filter. That is - we "test"
each pair of blocks on equality using calculated checksum of length λ. If the
pair consists of non-equal blocks, then the test either successfully discoveres it
(with probability 1− 2−λ) or not. The failure happens if less then a half of tests
succeed. We estimate the probability of failure using Chernoff’s inequality.
Formulating differently: On each step i, the N2i (amount of undiscovered pairs)
tests are performed, each failing with probability 2−λi =. The whole step fails if
more than a half of the tests fail.
For one step, this probability can be estimated:
P (Filtering out less then 1/2 pairs) < 2
N
2i
D(q,p)
Where
D(q, p) = q ln (
q
p
) + (1− q) ln (
1− q
1− p
), and q =
1
2
, p =
1
2λi
Substituting λ ≈ 2
i
log2 N
, this error probability is less then
P (Erri) ≤ O(2
−Nλi
2i ) = O(2
− N
log2 N )
Summing error probabilities for all steps of stages 2 and 3:
logN∑
i=1
O(2
− N
log2 N ) ≈ logN · O(2
− N
log2 N ) ≈ O(2
− N
log2 N
+log logN
) ≤ O(2
−c N
log2 N )
4.3.3 Pseudorandom generator In this section we construct a statistical
test (see the definition in section 3.1) that simulates one step of our protocol.
In a sense, this test verifies that (pseudo)random bits are “suitable” for our
communication protocol: they do not cause the failure of the protocol at the i-th
iteration.
The "advice strings" of this statistical test contains a sequence of pairs of
blocks X i, Y i from the inputs Alice and Bob, that were not shown to be not
equal before iteration i. The test should work correctly for all advice strings that
correspond to the possible internal states of Alice and Bob at the beginning of
iteration i.
The input x is a string of (pseudo)random bits that should be accepted or
rejected. The test must reject x (for some advice string a), if our communication
protocol “fails” at the i-th iteration with this random bits x while Alice and Bob
are given the blocks X i, Y i corresponding to the advice a.
The algorithm of the test is straightforward: it computes the checksums for
X i and Y i as it is done by our communication protocol at the i-th iteration,
with random bits x shared by Alice and Bob, and compares the corresponding
checksums for Alice’s and Bob’s blocks. Note that the test does not simulate
the synchronization procedure (the sub-protocols following the construction of
Orlitsky and Smith).
The working space of our machine is O( N
log2 N
). This is enough to simulate
the computation of the checksums performed by our communication protocol.
The test accepts x, if in the simulation at least 50% of non-equal pairs of blocks
are is successfully revealed, and rejects x otherwise. In other words, a teststring
x is rejected if it causes a failure at the i-th iteration of the protocol.
Theorem 3.1 guarantees that Nisan’s pseudo-random generator fools this test.
Hence, for our protocol the probability of failure with pseudo-random bits is not
much greater than the probability of failure for truly random bits. More precisely,
difference between the probabilities of failure for random and pseudo-random bits
is at most
2−S = O(2−c
N
log2 N ).
Technically, we should sum up this difference for all steps i = 1, . . . , logN ,
but this does not change the asymptotics: P (Err) ≤
∑logN
i=1 O(2
− N
log2 N ) =
O(2
−c3 N
log2 N )
4.3.4 Summary Probability of the error of our protocol consists of three
parts: (1) probability of an error in Smith’s protocol, (2) probability of failure
with truly random checksums on some step i = 1, . . . , logN , and (3) the addi-
tional probability of failure caused by the difference between truly random and
pseudorandom checksums:
P (Err) = O(2−c1(
N
logN )) +O(2
−c2 Nlog2 N ) +O(2−c3
N
logN ) = O(2
−C N
log2 N ).
This concludes the proof of correctness of our communication protocol. Com-
pared to the previous results(presented in [11]): P (Err) = O(2−
√
N ), our proto-
col provides better probability of error.
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